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1Chapter One 
Introduction 
To explore self-determination is, in the words of Antonio Cassese”, a way of 
opening a veritable Pandora’s Box.” Indeed, the historical evolution of the concept reveals 
that it has been subjected to ambiguity, misconception and contradictory application. Over 
the years, it was redefined and re-applied on the basis of the interests of particular states. 
More recent events, namely the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, have given a new 
perspective to the meaning of self-determination. In this post Cold War era, greater 
attention is being paid to the enforcement of human rights and with it, a broader 
understanding of both external and internal conceptions of self-determination.   
The purpose of my scholarship is to apply this new understanding of self-
determination in the case of Kosova Albanians. It begins with the pre WWI genesis of the 
Kosova cause in the Balkans; a period of national awakening on the eve of the Ottoman 
Empire’s destruction. In this period, Albanian leaders compiled a program to preserve the 
Albanian national identity and struggle for independence—a program ignored by the Great 
Powers.  
In the third chapter, I discuss the impact of the Versailles Conference on the 
application of the principle of self-determination until WWII. It was at Versailles where 
Kosova was ceded to Serbia.  I also discuss the status of Kosova within the newly 
established state, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this period, Kosova would not have any 
legal status and the basic human rights of Kosovar Albanians would be suppressed. 
2In the fourth chapter I examine the situation of Albanians in general during World 
War II and give an overview of events under the second Yugoslavia. The 1974 constitution 
of Yugoslavia advanced the status of Kosova but did not settle the issue of Albanians. I 
also analyze the impact of the rise of Serbian nationalism and the Yugoslav economic 
crisis of the 1980s. I conclude that they resulted in an illegal change in the status of 
Kosova by Serbia and the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
In the fifth chapter, I discuss the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 
manner in which it was handled by the international community. Special emphasis is given 
to the European Community guidelines recognizing new states.  I also discuss the political 
environment in Kosova, the peaceful efforts made by Albanians for international 
recognition, and the reasons for their failure.  
The sixth chapter focuses on the failure of the international community to respond to 
the Albanian efforts to achieve their goal, their resort to arms and the escalation of 
oppressive Serbian policies toward Albanians.  The chapter analyzes the impact of the 
failed peace talks at Rambouillet and the subsequent NATO air strikes to halt atrocities. 
 The seventh chapter discusses the installation of the United Nations Mission in 
Kosova (UNMIK) and the ambiguous status of Kosova--legally part of Serbia while in 
actuality under international administration. The chapter ends with the 2005 negotiation 
process to determine the final status of Kosova and offers some options for future status. 
3The eighth chapter reviews the evolution of the principle of self-determination. It 
concludes with reasons why Kosova has the right to self-determination, based on three 
factors: historical, legal and human rights. 
 The last chapter is the bibliography that includes a variety of sources in English, 
Albanian, Serbian and Croatian that were used to support the arguments presented in this 
paper. Throughout this paper, I have deliberately used the Albanian spelling of Kosova--
ending with the letter “a”.  While most authors refer to it as Kosovo--ending with the letter 
“o”, this is reflective of Serbian hegemony. Appropriate spelling is reflective of the right to 
self-determination. 
 
4Chapter Two 
Genesis of Kosova Identity in the Modern Era 
Albanian Renaissance and the Development of National Consciousness 
The early years of the 19th century opened a new era in the Balkans. In the wake of 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the winds of national consciousness and self-
determination that began with the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the 
French Revolution in 1789 would flow among the Balkan people. Yet the process of 
creating new states would involve outsiders.  The Balkans thus became a theatre where the 
Great Powers were the main actors.1 As other nations sought to take advantage of the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Albanians—the ancestors of the Illyrians (the first 
inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula)—defended their territories.2 Albanians were able to 
do so by consolidating their political powers through an enlightened sense of national self-
determination. 
 At this time, Albanians enjoyed weak support from the Great Powers while 
Russian aspirations in the region supported the idea of pan Slavism. In this geopolitical 
climate it seemed at first, that the best protection would be to require autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire which would embrace all the Albanian inhabited lands3. The concern was 
evident because, as Serbia began to emerge in 1804, Albanians who lived in Nis and 
 
1 Skender Anamali & Kristaq Prifti, HISTORIA E POPULLIST SHQIPTAR (V-2, 2002), at 17 (Skender 
Anamali & Kristaq Prifti, HISTROY OF THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE, (V-2, 2002)) 
2 Tom Gallagher, OUTCAST OF EUROPE: THE BALKANS, 1789 – 1989, FROM OTTOMAN TO 
MILOSEVIC (2001), at 19 
3 Noel Malcom, KOSOVO - A SHORT HISTORY, at 182 
5surrounding areas (that are currently within Serbia bordering Kosova), were forced to 
emigrate or flee to territories which compose present day Kosova. All the villages were 
burned behind them4. This event resembled a huge migration of the Albanian population 
that occurred in late 1737 known as ‘The Second Migration’5.
Albanian efforts to control their inhabited territories and obtain wider autonomy, 
started at the end of the 18th and the early 19th century. This resulted in the creation of two 
Albanian dynasties. One of them was the Bushati dynasty, which controlled the northern 
part of Albania including Kosova. This dynasty was known for its equal treatment of all 
citizens regardless of religion or nationality. It created diplomatic relations with Western 
European countries and became an independent ally of the French revolutionary army6.
Feeling threatened of losing control over the territory, the Ottoman Empire sent a military 
expedition that retained military control. But, this did not stop the resistance of the 
Albanian people, and in particular the general reforms announced by the Porte, the main 
governing body of the Ottoman Empire7.
As one of the last efforts to save the empire, the Ottomans announced reforms 
which were introduced into the territories of Kosova in 1843. Attempts to impose a 
conscription system in Kosova, introduce new taxes, and disarm the population, led to vast 
 
4 Tim Judah, Kosovo, WAR  AND REVENGE (2002), at 11 – 12 
5 According to Ottoman Document in 1738 Janjevo, Novo Berdo, Prishtina and Vucitrn were all destroyed 
and the people there either fled or were killed. Cited by Noel Malcom, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY, at 
170 
6 Supra note 3 at 175 – 177  
7 Stavro Skendi, THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING (1967),  17 – 27  
6popular revolts from 1843 through 18458. The revolt started in Prishtina (now capital of 
Kosova). The main Albanian demand was to protect the weak autonomy enjoyed prior to 
imposition of the reforms. Despite fierce battles and resistance, the revolt was crushed by 
1845 when a large army was sent on the Sultan’s order to deal with the situation9. Kosova, 
though, would stay in the state of permanent revolution in their quest to protect their 
lands10.
In 1867, as part of the general reforms, the Ottoman Empire introduced a new 
territorial administrative division and created new provinces called vilayetes. Among them, 
the vilayet of Kosova was formed composing four minor administrative territorial divisions 
known as sanxhak. The main administrative city was Prizren. After the Congress of Berlin, 
the center of power later shifted to Prishtina until 1888.11 According to reliable data, the 
absolute majority of the population was Albanian. This contradicts the Serbian “Arnautas 
theory” established by Serbian writers, claiming that the Albanian population was in fact 
Albanianized Serb. Called by German expert Gustav Weigand, as a “mass of crude lies”, it 
is also widely known as the Serbian conspiracy theory12.
8 Supra note 3 at 185 – 186 
9 Supra note 1 at 93 – 94  
10 Supra note 3 at 186 
11 Dr. Liman Rushiti, NDARJA TERRITORIAL DHE RREGULLIMI ADMINISTRATIV I KOSOVES 
1878 – 1941 (2004), at 13-14 (PhD Liman Rushiti, TERRITORIAL DIVISION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGULATION OF KOSOVA 1878 – 1941 (2004)) 
12 Supra note 3 at 192 – 201 
7European Politics and the Albanian National Question: Failed Attempts of the 
Albanians at Unification and the Emergence of the Albanian Cause in the Balkans 
The Ottoman defeat by Russia, and the notorious agreement in Budapest known as 
the Saint Stefan Agreement in 1877, encouraged Albanian patriots and politicians to unify 
in order to preserve its borders by organizing a country.13 The same agreement, supported 
by the idea of Pan Slavism, also led Serbian nationalists to begin to expand their territories 
towards Albanian inhabited lands14. The Serb aspirations were made public earlier in their 
famous plan called Nacertania (The Outline) in 184415. The idea of Pan Slavism 
concerned not only Albanians but also the European Great Powers. Great Britain, in 
particular, was concerned that the European dominions of the Ottoman Empire were falling 
under the influence of Russia16. Thus, the Great Powers attempted to settle the Balkan 
issue in another congress that would be held in Berlin17. At this time the policy of the 
 
13 Supra note 1 at 133 – 142  
14 Supra note 3 at  
15 Enver Hasani, SELF – DETERMINATION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
STABILITY, THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA (2005) at 125 – 126. The famous document called Nacertania 
(the Outline) was drafted by Ilija Garasanin in 1844. The document called for the unification of all Serbs but 
also for acquiring  Albanian inhabited lands as well as Macedonia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
16 John Arthur Ransome Marriot, THE EASTERN QUESTION: AN HISTORICAL STUDY IN 
EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY (1917), at 283. The idea of Pan Slavism was raised in 1867 in the congress of 
Moscow, which established a central committee in Moscow and sub committees in Bucharest. This idea 
affected the western European countries interests, in particular Britain, and was in conflict with the Paris 
Congress agreement of 1856, which acknowledged the borders of Ottoman Empire, thus a rising tensions of 
great powers in the region. 
17 Id at 291 – 300 
8Great Powers was to keep the Ottoman Empire weak rather than have Russian influence in 
the Balkans. 
With the Congress scheduled to take place in the near future, Albanians prepared to 
present themselves as united and non-separable, with a unique platform. This process was 
achieved on June 10, 1878 at the Albanian Congress held in Prizren, with the creation of 
the Prizren League.  Due to their weak geopolitical situation, they realized that the best 
way to protect national interests would be to seek autonomy withing the Ottoman Empire, 
but as unified Albanian territories in one vilayet18. The purpose of the League of Prizren 
was to make the European powers aware of the existence of the separate national interests 
of the Albanian people19. The aim of the League was simply to stop any territory from 
being occupied by foreign troops20.
Despite all the efforts, the Albanians were denied their national representation at 
the Congress of Berlin. The League had to present its proposals through the British 
representative. The Albanian stance at the Congress was against partition of Albanian 
territory. They also indicated that if territories were to be ceded to Serbia or Montenegro or 
other countries, they would protect them even by force if necessary21. The main demands 
 
18 Supra note 1 at 131-162 
19 Supra note 2 at 49 
20 Supra note 3 at 221 
21 Supra note 1 at 39 – 40, The existence of the league and its program was stressed in the letter of Consul 
Kirby Green addressed to the Maruis of Salisbury, stating that the “League has no intention of making war 
either against Montenegro, Austria, Serbia, Bulgaria, Russia or Greece, but it has thus given the world notice 
that Albania is, so to speak, entitled property, and Sultan cannot make away with a single inch of it without 
the consent of the heirs-at-law the Albanians, see also supra note 3 at 239 – 240 
9of the League were: 1) unite all Albanian territories in one vilayet, 2) all civil servants 
serving in Albanian territories must be able to speak and write Albanian, 3) develop 
education in Albanian, 4) allocate enough money as needed from the general income of the 
vilayet to be used for the development of education and public reconstruction22.
The Congress of Berlin, which opened June 13, 1878 under the auspices of the 
Great Powers, ultimately did not take Albanian rights and requirements under 
consideration. They ignored the existence of an Albanian nation partly because of weak 
support from Austria-Hungary23. The final outcome of the Congress in regard to the 
Albanian lands was to award the northern part of Albanian lands that belonged to the 
vilayet of Kosova to Serbia (Pirot, Vranja and Nis) and to Montenengro (Tivar, Podgorica, 
Plava, Gucia, Rugova and Kolashin)24. The Congress also failed to address the future of 
Albanian territories that were left under the Ottoman Empire.25 Albanian territories that 
compose present day Kosova would remain under the Ottoman Empire. 
 
22 Ilijaz Rexha, LIDHJA PRIZRENTI NE DOKUMENTET OSMANE (1978) at 43 - 45 
23 Earlier in the secret Austrian – Russian Convention in 1877, Austria mentioned as a possible 
scenario the creation of an independent Albanian state in the case of dissolution of Ottoman Empire, see id at 
47 - 48 
24 Supra note 1 at 162 – 163 
25 Supra note 3 at 228 – 229, A massive exodus followed establishment of Serbian rule in the 
territories ceded to her in an attempt to deny the Albanian presence on these territories. According to western 
statistics, there were 60 000 Albanian families fled that to Macedonia, while another 60 – 70,000  fled to 
remaining territories of Kosova. 
10
Balkan Wars and the Partitioning of the Albanian Inhabited Areas 
In 1908 the appeal of nationalism within the central authority of the Ottoman 
Empire was evident when officers known as the Young Turks seized power from Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II. Again, this situation proved a good opportunity for other nations to 
expand their territories. This period saw the creation of different alliances between Balkans 
countries (such as the Bulgarian-Greek alliance and the Bulgarian-Serbian alliance) whose 
purpose was to further expand their territories26. Subsequently these alliances led to 
growing confrontations over domination in the Balkans that caused the Balkans Wars. 
Serbian, Greek and Montenegrin forces occupied most of Albania by the close of the first 
Balkan War at the end of 191227. Albanian revolts to gain control and protect their lands 
started during the year 1908, and spread all over Albanian territories by 1912 when the 
independence of Albania was declared. Their success concerned both Greece and Serbia, 
which feared that unless they reacted promptly, they might find the ground cut from under 
their feet, thus stopping their advantage of expanding their territories28. Albanian 
independence was declared at the height of the Balkans War when most of the territories 
were occupied by foreign troops29. This provided an opportunity for re-emergence of the 
Russian supported Serbian chauvinist plan, followed by the organized propaganda of 
“Albanian lawlessness against defenseless Serbs.”30 The Albanian factor in the Eastern 
 
26 Supra note 2 at 62 – 64 
27 Supra note 2 at 65 
28 Supra note 16 at 396 – 398 
29 Supra note 1 at 391 – 436 
30 Supra note 3 at 243 
11
Crisis was double edged. Albania was an object of desire by Austria – Hungary, Italy, 
Greece and Serbia.  
The Ambassadors Conference, held in London in 1913, was set to end the Balkans 
Wars and be concerned with new border lines once it became clear that Ottoman Empire 
was too weak to handle internal national movements. Austria–Hungary did not want Slav 
interference in the Balkans and feared establishment of a Russian outpost in the 
Mediterranean Sea through the port of Durres (important Albanian port). It thus supported 
creation of an Albanian state. However, although the Albanian people had a clear cultural 
and linguistic identity, they had not yet been recognized as a separate nation-state despite 
weak support from Austria–Hungary. Even further, when Albania became independent in 
1912, Kosova was ceded to Serbian rule in 1913, following the Ambassadors Conference--
a decision that was again restated at the Versailles Peace Conference.  It was at Versailles 
when the second major injustice occurred. Large amounts of Albanian territories that 
nowadays compose Kosova were ceded to Serbia. 
The 1912 – 1913 Balkan wars confirmed the reputation of the region as a zone of 
intense national rivalry and indeed hatred. Serbia, Montenegro and Greece subjected 
Albanians to heavy repression, both during and after the Wars. The oppression of Albanian 
villages that continued afterwards has been described by some scholars as the Third Balkan 
War31.
31 Supra note 2 at 65 – 67 
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Chapter Three 
Legal Status of Kosova up to the World War Two 
The Establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Suppression of 
Albanian Identity and Nationality 
The Versailles Conference ended the First World War and established the new 
world order. It established the first global organization, the League of Nations. The 
purpose of the League was to prevent future wars and enhance peaceful resolution of 
disputes32. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, new states emerged. Some were created 
based on the principle of national self-determination, while others were created based on 
geopolitical concessions and thus undermined the will of the people’s concerned. The latter 
policy established the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would later be 
known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Great Powers created what they believed was a 
single nation state representing numerous disparate groups33. In truth, the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was an artificial state that failed to equally represent all ethnic groups34.
32 The Covenant of the League of Nations  was established as a part of the Versailles Treaty on June 28, 
1919, see The Covenant of the League of Nations available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/parti.htm 
33 John R. Lampe, YUGOSLAVIA AS HITORY: TWICE THERE WAS A COUNTRY (2000) at 105 – 106. 
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established on December, 1918 based on the Corfu 
Declaration and Belgrade Proclamation. It actually was a reward to the Serbs under the guise of Serbia’s 
wartime espousal of “Yugoslavism”. The scholar Mark Wheeler notes “The Union of 1 December 1918 was 
a shotgun wedding; the honeymoon was as short as the hangover was long”, as quoted by Christopher 
Bennett, YUGOSLAVIA’S BLOODY COLAPSE (1995) at 33  
34 Hurst Hannum, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1996) at 53 
13
The principle of national self-determination advanced by President Woodrow 
Wilson in his Fourteen Points was not equally applied. The Great Powers used the 
document when it advanced their own interests. Those states fortunate to be on the winning 
side when the First World War ended were given favorable allocations of territories. At 
Versailles, they applied the principle of self-determination to justify the dissolution of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman empires but not in forming a nation. Rather, in the case of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Great Powers created an ethnically and religiously mixed 
country based on the domination of the Serbs.35. The purpose of this was to create large 
states as buffers to the defeated powers, and to contain the menace of the Bolsheviks, the 
extreme socialists who had seized power in Russia in 191736.
In order to balance their policy towards nationalities left under the other states, the 
Great Powers introduced national minority treaties and urged those states such as the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia to sign the Declaration for the Protection of Minorities. The 
treaties were categorized. The first category included the defeated states of Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. The second included new states created out of the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The third category included special regimes 
established in Aland, Danzig, the Memel Territory and Upper Silesia. However, these 
treaties were characterized by a selective imposition. They guaranteed what at the time had 
 
35 Susan L. Woodward, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 
(1995) at 22 – 23. Some scholars say that the genesis of the destruction of Yugoslavia is its creation itself 
which was based on the dominance of one nation over the other, “It was the Croats and their relations with 
the Serbs the reason for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and their different conception of the idea of 
Yugoslavism”,  Enver Hasani, SHPERBERJA E ISH-JUGOSLLAVISE DHE KOSOVA (2000) at 18 – 25 
(Enver Hasani, DISSOLUTION OF FORMER YUGOSLAVAIA AND KOSOVA (2000)) 
36 Supra note 2 at. 77 – 78 
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come to be viewed as traditional minority rights regarding religion, language and cultural 
activities. They did not imply any broader economic or political autonomy, except in the 
special cases of Danzig, Memel and Upper Silesia. Most importantly, the purported self-
determination of certain nationalities was the result of the dictates of the Great Powers. In 
Paris, minorities were permitted to lobby, but not given the right to vote at home37.
This affected persons of Albanian nationality. Serbia’s representative persistently 
refused to address minority rights in the southern part of the state. It refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the Albanian population in Kosova38. In fact, the very 
existence of the Albanian population was denied and Kosova became a synonym for the 
depravation of basic human rights.39. By signing the treaty on the protection of minority 
rights, Yugoslavia tried to give the impression that it was prepared to give even the 
Albanians “just and effective guarantees” of their rights. But they did not apply them with 
regards to southern minorities. The Serbs claimed that the declaration applied only to the 
areas taken over by Austria-Hungary, even though the reference in the Treaty to “the areas 
taken over by Serbia and Montenegro since January, 1913 proves the opposite”40.
Yugoslavia’s highly centralized state apparatus was enshrined in the St. Vitus Day, 
or the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921. In the absence of Croat political parties, Serbs made 
deals with the Bosnian Muslim landowners and pushed through a centralist constitution 
 
37 Supra note 34 at 52 - 55 
38 Supra note 33 at 116 - 117 
39 Zejnullah Gruda, E DREJTA E POPUJVE PER VETEVENDOSJE (1996) at 14 (Zejnullah Gruda, 
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (1996)) 
40 A presentation by Frank Muenzel , Kosovo & Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis (1999), JURIST, A Law 
Professors Network at 15 – 16, article is available on internet: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/simop.htm 
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virtually unopposed. All of the changes, including the creation of the nation itself, occurred 
with the exclusion not only of the Albanians but also of the other non-Serb populations 
(with the exception of Bosnian Muslims landowners).41 The situation of the Albanian 
population under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia became worse every day. In the new Serb 
dominated centralized state apparatus, Serbian forces were free to take revenge against 
Albanians who resisted seizure of their lands. 
In a petition presented to the Secretary General of the League of Nations dated May 
5, 1930, the Albanian clergy stated that Yugoslav authorities failed to impose provisions of 
the Declaration for Protection of Minorities signed by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia42. In its 
eight annexes, the petition emphasizes eight important points in violation of Articles 2, 3, 
7, 8, 9, 10. These articles involved 1) the protection of life 2) protection of freedom, 3) 
protection of property, 4) civil and political rights, 5) right to use the language, 6) right to 
establish private schools and charity organizations, 7) right to public education, and 8) 
right to religion43. The petition pointed out three different gross violations against 
Albanians: 1) prosecutions to force Albanians to leave their homes, resulting in more than 
140,000 Albanians settling in Turkey and Albania and other countries, 2) employment of 
 
41 Christopher Bennett, YUGOSLAVIA’S BLOODY COLLAPSE: CAUSES, COURSE AND 
CONSEQUENCES (1995) at 36 – 37  
42 Memoire presente a la Societe des Nations par Done Jean Bisaku, Don Etienne Kurti et Don Louis GAshi, 
La Situation de la Minorite en Yugoslavie, available in the State Archive of Federal Secretariat for Foreign 
Affairs in Belgrade, DASIF Beograd, Fond DNZ 15. DI. secr. 4/19507/10528, the copy of the original 
petition is also available in pro-memoir by Hakif Bajrami, Peticionin qe I shpetoi shqiptaret ne shqiperine 
kontinentale nga fashizmi serb, (2005) at 25 – 73 
43 Article 2 of the petition 
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force and violation to assimilate defenseless people and 3) prosecuting and destroying 
individuals who refused to abandon their land or to assimilate and Serbianize.  
The petition criticized the League of Nations for not doing enough to protect 
minorities, and for failing to investigate documents presented by the Yugoslav authorities 
which disputed these claims. For example, the Yugoslav document (C.370 of August 26, 
1929) on the situation of the Albanian minority stated that Albanians established their own 
schools, while in fact more than 800,000 Albanians had no primary schools at all, not did 
they hold any important position in the state administration. The Albanian petition 
requested the League of Nations to establish an international commission to oversee the 
enforcement of the Minority Treaty. Unfortunately, the petition failed to convince the 
international community to do so44.
Albanian Struggle and the Expulsion Projects 
The creation of Yugoslavia was an attempt to solve the national question of the 
Southern Slavs, excluding the Bulgarians. It represented an almost total realization of the 
Serb national program of complete control of its state structures45. The territory of Kosova 
remained an administrative part of the state without any specific legal status. Albanians 
were not recognized even as a national minority46. Serbia, or Yugoslavia under the 
 
44 Supra note 42 at 1 – 6  
45 Hajredin Kuqi, INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA/O STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN 
THE BALKANS (2005) at 28 – 29 
46 Id at 29 
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dominance and control of Serbia, tried to eliminate the Kosovar Albanians, through a racist 
ideology propagated by Cvijic and Cubrilovic47.
The Albanians persistently rejected Serbian authority. They organized guerilla like 
warfare in the early 1920s in units called Kacaks. When the revolt was crushed, the Kacaks 
resisted the reimposition of Serbian or Yugoslavian rule. They did not want Kosovo to be 
part of Yugoslavia. It was after all, a state of the south Slavs, as it name suggested, and the 
Albanians are not Slavs.  
The Kosova Committee, which was previously formed to lobby the American 
government to protect Albanian national interests, then took the lead to organize a Kacak 
movement inside Kosova. The goals of self-determination and peaceful secession were set 
in the general rules of the movement. They included two principal points 1) that there 
would be no arms raised against local Serbs, and 2) no one would dare to burn down a 
house or destroy a church48. Before resorting to arms, Albanians tried diplomatically to 
resolve the problem. During 1920, Albanian leaders met with a senior official of Serbia 
and put forward the requirements of the Albanians (also known as eight points): right to 
self-determination, cease killing of Albanians and taking their land, end the colonization 
program, end army action carried on the pretext of disarmament, and cease interning the 
families of insurgents.49 
47 Id 
48 Supra note 3 at 273 – 275  
49 Id 
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The revolt of the Albanian population was fuelled by the fact that Albanian 
language schools were being closed50. Serbian authorities tried to justify the closing of the 
schools, by claiming there were no qualified school teachers, despite the evidence to the 
contrary. Also no Albanian publications could be published during this period. On the 
other hand, private Turkish schools and mektebs (Islamic elementary schools) were 
allowed and almost every other minority in Yugoslavia had its publications in their 
language51. In spite of this suppression, Albanians managed to organize schools in private 
homes to keep their identity. (The same model would be used during the 1990s when again 
Albanians would be expelled from their school buildings). Beside schools, Albanians also 
created “illegal” organizations such as Agimi (Dawn) and Drita (Light). These operated 
through legal youth clubs and sports organizations, to disseminate books smuggled from 
Albania52.
In order to fulfill their goals, the Serbs started the process of colonization in 
Kosova. During it, many Serbs came from other parts of Yugoslavia. Land reform was the 
most important legislation passed in the interwar period. Large estates were broken up and 
the land was distributed among peasants, many of whom were Serbs. Inevitably these 
reforms came at the expense of the existing non Serb landowners53. The official policy of 
Serbia was to settle official Serb farmers, and townspeople, while seeking to “Serbianize” 
 
50 Many Albanian people died during the clashes and many villages were destroyed. According to the Serbian 
philosophy of closing Albanian schools, the Albanians would remain “backward, unenlightened and stupid”, 
see supra note 4 at 21 – 22. 
51 Supra note 3 at 267 – 268  
52 Supra note 4 at 22 
53 Supra note 41 at 40 
19
the Albanian majority linguistically and politically54. From 1935, a wave of confiscating of 
land from Albanians grew, based on the new rule that all land should be treated as public 
property unless the farmer had a Yugoslav document to prove its ownership--something 
rarely issued to Albanians55.
The most educated Serbian intellectuals drafted different expulsion programs and 
laws. Among them was the notorious Vasa Cubrilovic who supported more rigorous 
methods to achieve expulsion. Cubrilovic was highly critical of the colonization program 
because he believed it attempted to solve the problem of “bleeding Balkans” by Western 
methods. Because he was concerned about world reaction, in particular Britain and France, 
he attempted to conceal his expulsion program by carrying it out at the same time and in 
the same manner as Germany and Russia. That is, he applied the same techniques used by 
Germans to expel Jews and Stalin to shift millions of Russians and minorities, from one 
part of the Soviet Union to the other. In this way he hoped that the expulsion of Albanians 
would go unnoticed in the world’s eyes56. He sketched the program for the expulsion of 
Albanians from Kosova and Serbian colonization of the depopulated areas in his 1937 
lecture entitled “Evacuation of Arnauts”57. He also urged state officials to use physical and 
 
54 William W. Hagen, The Balkan’s Lethal Nationalism, Journal of Foreign Affairs (July-Augus 1999), v78 
i4 p.57 
55 In one example of this process, the entire Albanian population of twenty-three villages in upper Drenica 
(6,064) was dispossessed Supra note 3 at 283 
56 Supra note 4 at 23 
57 “Arnaut” is the Turkish word for Albanian. 
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psychological means to pressure Albanians to leave. Part of his program also included 
distributing weapons to the new colonists to encourage the rest of the population to leave58.
As a result of the colonization program, hundreds of thousands of Serbians 
occupied Kosova. The long term purpose of the program was to change the national 
composition of the population there. Between the two world wars, over 11,000 Serb 
families with some 54,000 members and some 120.000 individuals were settled in 
Kosova59. This was eventually the same program the Serbian government followed after 
1991 in a new modified plan.  
Expulsion of the Albanian population continued throughout this period until the 
Second World War. To achieve its aims, the Serbian government even entered into shadow 
agreements with other states such as Turkey in 1938, where 40,000 families (200,000 
people) emigrated over the next six years. In the end, though, the Cubrilovic document 
remained a dead letter because of the outbreak of the Second World War60.
58 Mojmir Krizan, New Serbian Nationalism and The Third Balkan War, Studies in East European Thought 
(1994) at 47 – 48. According to Vasa Cubrilovic’s project the Serbian authorities should use different means 
such as fines, police arrests, cutting forests, damaging fields, forced labor etc. to make the life harder for 
Albanians so they will eventually leave their lands. 
59 Supra note 35 at 31 
60 Although the Convention talked about the “repatriation” of the Turkish Muslim population, it was clear 
that from the regions specified in the convention that the bulk of these people would be Albanian, see Supra 
note 4 at 22 – 23 
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Chapter Four 
The Emergence of Autonomy Claims 
Unification of Albanian Inhabited Lands during the Second World War, the 
Communist Movement and the Establishment of the Second Yugoslavia 
The Second World War started in Europe on September 1939 with the invasion of 
Poland by German troops61. Thus started the expansion of Germany by conquest rather 
than annexation. Yugoslavia (including Kosova) fell under German occupation during 
April 1941, while Albania and Greece fell under Italian occupation. On April 20, 1941, 
Kosova was joined to Albania by an agreement between the German and Italian foreign 
ministers. The Italian government, by the decrees of October 1941 and February 1942, 
gave Albanian citizenship to all peoples living in Kosova62. After the collapse of the Italian 
fascist government, German troops occupied Albanian territories and officially recognized 
Albania, within the borders established by Mussolini, as an independent country63.
When the Second World War came to an end, the reformulation of the world order 
began. It became clear that the Albanians wanted to correct decisions made without their 
consent, by focusing on national self-determination. This became more evident when 
Serbians developed another program for Greater Serbia formulated by Stevan Moljevic. On 
June 30, 1941, Moljevic published his program, “Homogeneous Serbia”. In this, he posited 
 
61 Bruce Robinson, World War Two: Summary  of Key Events, BBC, 
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62 However some small territories of Kosova remained under German military occupation governed by 
Serbian officials from Belgrade. In spite of  Serbian objections, Albanian schools were allowed on these 
territories, see Supra note 3 at 291 - 293 
63 Id at 304 
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a new “theory” that because Serbs were the first to oppose German occupation, they 
acquired the right to the Balkans and its destiny. His theory gave them the right to express 
Serbian hegemony and fulfill their political mission64.
At the end of World War II, the Kosovar Albanians fought vainly for nearly a year 
against their reincorporation into the Yugoslav state. In an attempt to tear down these 
Albanian nationalist feelings, and help establish the Communist party in Kosova, the 
Yugoslav Communist Party played the self-determination card. In December 1943, with 
the permission of the Yugoslav Communists in Kosova, the Albanian Communist Party 
advocated self-determination up to and including secession65.
The Albanians responded by calling the Conference of Bujane in which the 
Serbians and Montenegrins participated66. At this Conference, the Albanian desire for self-
determination was included in the so-called Bujane Resolution.67. However this resolution 
was totally ignored by the Serbs. In response, the Albanians resorted to force to defend 
their rights. Albanian partisans and commanders fought Serb nationalist paramilitary 
groups called Chetnik, until 1945.  During that time, 44 villages were destroyed and 
approximately 20,000 people killed68.
Shortly after the Conference of Bujane, the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) 
manipulated some Albanian communists to create a so called “Kosova Parliament” where 
 
64 Supra note 54 at 46 – 52 
65 Supra note 3 at 307 
66 Sami Repishti, Rezoluta e Bujanit 2 Janar 1944: Nje Analize, Studime Historike at 92, (Sami Repishti, The 
Bujane Resolution January 2, 1944: An Analysis, Historical Studies at 92) 
67 Id. at 96, see also supra note 3 at 308 
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it was decided that Kosova should join “Federal Serbia” in July 194569. This decision was 
interpreted as an exercise of “free will” as defined by Lenin70. That is, once people express 
their will “freely,” they cannot reclaim it later. Serbs took this position to justify their 
stance. Subsequently, Serbian communists ruled Albanians in Kosova in a colonial fashion 
causing nearly 250,000 Albanians to emigrate from Kosova71.
Continuation of the Expulsion Programs by the Communist State 
The constitution established in 1946 for the Second Yugoslavia, recognized 
Albanians as a national minority72. Even so, the post war era, known among Albanians as 
the Rankovic period, resulted in a massive expulsion of Kosovar Albanians73. During this 
time, the Albanians were also subjected to colonization, mass arrests and the return to 
institutional domination by Serbs and Montenegrins74. This continued until the late 1960s 
when Rankovic’s police apparatus was dismantled in the province of Kosova75. This was a 
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moral and psychological blow to the “Greater Serbia” mentality of his supporters who had 
worked actively to maintain Serbian supremacy in the province.76 
After this period, Serbs and Montenegrins lost their rights to dominate state 
political institutions, while the Albanians were freed to publicly express their needs. The 
Albanians did so through demonstrations in 1968 when they demanded the same legal 
status that other republics held within Yugoslavia. This led to some constitutional 
amendments which partly improved Kosova’s legal status77. However, their demand for an 
Albanian language university was denied them. At the same time, other republic’s 
advocated a more decentralized Yugoslavia. The two republics that were most active were 
Croatia and Slovenia. Both desired more power in their interior affairs78.
The 1974 Constitution and the Semi-Republican Status of Kosova 
The new reality, and pressure from other republics, resulted in the adoption of 
constitutional amendments in 1968, 1971 and 1974. All were embodied in the new 
Yugoslav Constitution in 1974. With this constitution, Kosova was granted the status of an 
autonomous province, with clear border definitions and the power to approve of 
constitutional changes.  All provinces were perceived as equal and responsible in 
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allocating and executing federal policies, as well as in the federal decision making process. 
That is to say, Kosova had the right to veto79.
The constitutional legal position of Kosova was characterized by two main factors. 
The first characterizes Kosova as a political–territorial unit. The second characterizes 
Kosova as a constituting element of the Yugoslav Federation. In the former, the main 
constitutional features were independence in the areas of territorial integrity, judiciary, 
finance, economics, protection of constitutionality and legislation, international relations, 
and maintaining order, providing security and national defense. In the latter, Kosova was 
given an advanced status within the federal structure of Yugoslavia. That is, while Kosova 
was considered an integral part of the Yugoslav Federation, it had its own territories and 
borders. As with the other republics, Kosova was one of eight federal units which had its 
own president, national bank and other administrative bodies with defined powers and 
duties. Also, Kosova was permitted a measure of international action within the framework 
of a foreign policy defined by Yugoslavia and international treaties. Kosova was 
represented in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the parliament of Yugoslavia 
where it had the right to propose laws and other acts. It also was represented in the Federal 
Executive Council, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, and other federal courts, 
Kosova had an equal position with the other republics in the procedure of approving and 
changing the constitution of Yugoslavia80.
79 Kurtesh Salihu, LINDJA, ZHVILLIMI DHE ASPEKTET E AUTONOMITETIT TE KRAHINES 
SOCIALISTE ATUTONOME TE KOSOVES NE JUGOSLLAVINE SOCIALISTE (1984) at 58 
80 Supra note 42 at 39 – 44  
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In spite of this, the new constitution did not advance the status of Kosova to that of 
a republic, which was the main demand of the Kosovar Albanians. Nor did the new 
constitution satisfy the Serbs who began to stir the populace with cries of nationalism.  
However, the Albanian request for their republic embodied an awakening of a national 
pride among Albanians which had been suppressed for years81. After the death of Tito in 
1981, Albanians were again in the streets seeking their legitimate right to a republic within 
the system. They believed this was their only recourse, because formal talks at the federal 
level were going nowhere. These demonstrations were suppressed and for the first time in 
Kosova, the police used firearms82. Serbia used these demonstrations as a pretext to seal 
off the whole country, and to send in “special police” to brutally clamp down on the 
demonstrators. More than 200 persons were killed in this action. A purge of people 
considered “guilty of ideological diversification” in Kosovar institutions followed. Many 
Albanians were arrested, trials were held in camera and some demonstrators were 
sentenced up to 15 years in prison83.
Rise of Serbian Nationalism and Break-up of Kosova Status within Yugoslavia 
Serb politicians tried to use every maneuver possible to portray Albanians as 
people who would politically destabilize and threaten Yugoslav survival. In fact it was 
Serbian propaganda and hegemonic appetites that were destabilizing. To further encourage 
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nationalism among Serbs, the League of Communists of Serbia organized a marathon 
session from December 24–26, 1981, devoted to interethnic relations within the republic. 
In the meeting, Serbs claimed that the existence of two autonomous provinces (Kosova and 
Vojvodina) within Serbia damaged its constitutional unity. They also maintained that 
Serbia was not getting the same treatment as other republics. During the session, one of the 
leading figures of Serbian politics, Draza Markovic, claimed that Yugoslavia actually 
consisted of five nations--Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Serbs. This was an open 
threat not only to Kosova but also to Vojvodina and Bosnia84.
In 1986, highly respected Serbian intellectuals of the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences unofficially prepared a notorious memorandum to fuel Serb nationalism. 
Essentially the memorandum was an elaborate, if crude, conspiracy theory. According to 
the authors of the memorandum, Croats in the person of Tito and Slovenes in the person of 
Edvard Kardelj, had deliberately constructed Federal Yugoslavia to exploit Serbia 
economically. It blamed Tito for allegedly trying to weaken Serbia with the Constitution of 
1974, by carving the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Serbia out of Serbia. The 
memorandum went as far as to claim that Serbs were victims of organized genocide by 
“irredentist and separatist” Albanians85. Despite protests, the Academy neither repudiated 
the memorandum’s contents nor published an official version86.
84 Sabrina P. Ramet, Views from inside: Memoirs concerning the Yugoslav Breakup and War, Slavic Review, 
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85 Supra note 41 at 81 – 82 
86 Supra note 54 at 
28
With the memorandum in place, Serbs needed an appropriate leader to give life to 
these nationalist theories. A growing nationalism, an economic crisis, and an economic gap 
between republics paved the way for the emergence of a dictator. Slobadan Milosevic, a 
Serbian leader whose status in public politics started to emerge in the late 1980’s, took 
advantage of the new situation. Milosevic emerged out of the economic crisis involving 
high international debts when Western creditors refused to continue the reckless lending of 
the 1970’s87. Milosevic was able to gain power by combining nationalism with an 
economic crisis, as the Japanese nationalists and German Nazis had, during the world 
depression prior to WWII88.
Serb leaders also used other means to fuel tensions not only among Serbs and 
Albanians, but also among Serbs and other republics. A petition emerged from the ranks of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church demanding the protection of the Serbian people of Kosova 
and their holy shrines. The Serbian Academy of Science and Arts drafted the notorious 
memorandum, which sent shock waves thorough Yugoslavia. Additionally, Serbian 
historians began re-examining the way in which the story of World War II had been told89.
In May 1985, an alleged Albanian rape of a Kosova Serb man was widely reported in the 
Serbian media, which not only seemed to confirm the revisionist victimization thesis, but 
also provoked a call for urgent political and police action to protect the Serb population in 
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Kosovo from Albanian violence. Serbian authorities also claimed that the Serbian 
population was leaving Kosova under pressure of the Albanians90.
This psychological preparation culminated in organized rallies and meetings. In 
1987 Milosevic organized a meeting in Kosova where he addressed the Serbian crowd by 
saying that “no one should dare to beat you”. Emotions were also fueled in 1989, when the 
bones of the tsar Lazar, the King of Serbia, were carried all around Serbia to recall “the 
real souls of Serbians” before they were reburied91 in Gracanica (a village near Prishtina) 
with the supervision and approval of the Serbian Orthodox Church.   
In addition to psychological preparations, Serbs also concentrated on the Serb 
dominated Yugoslav Peoples Army. Beginning in the early 1980’s and accelerating 
between 1985 and 1990, all places inhabited by Serbs fell under the direct command of the 
Belgrade Army. The process was completed in Kosova immediately following the 
1981demonstrations92.
All of this culminated in 1989 when the Belgrade regime began to abolish 
Kosova’s autonomy. The federal Presidency unilaterally approved constitutional changes, 
thus violating the Constitution of Yugoslavia that required the consent of Kosova and the 
federal parliament. This action destroyed the political and economic autonomy of Kosova. 
 
90 It was true that the percentage of population slightly shifted in favor of Albanians. This was not due to 
Serb emigration. However the Serb population after the Second World War remained relatively stable. The 
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While Belgrade celebrated these changes in an unusually festive session of the Serbian 
Assembly on March 29, 1989, the Albanians of Kosova counted their dead93.
93 Supra note 42 at 46 
31
Chapter Five 
A Case for Self Determination after the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia  
Failed Attempts to Keep Yugoslavia Alive 
As the former Yugoslavia was in full gallop towards its destruction, there were still 
some last ditch efforts made to reorganize the federated system. The efforts probed to be 
fruitless due to a heightened nationalism and economic disparities within the republics. 
With Kosova now under its shadow, Milosevic’s Serbia moved to impose itself on the 
other republics. Milosevic’s goal was to have a tighter Yugoslav state with Serb 
dominance. In the worst scenario, he would use the Serb population within the other 
republics to revolt, secede and request incorporation with Serbia. This scenario would 
prevail and subsequently would lead to bloody war. 
In Yugoslavia, the issue of sovereignty became complicated because of 
uncertainties in defining the term.  Were the people, or the republic, the bearer of the 
sovereignty? There were major clashes on the concept of sovereignty between Serbia and 
other republics. The Serbs supported the concept of national self-determination, while the 
other republics relied on the concept of territorial sovereignty94. However, only Slovenia 
had both clear boundaries and a defined population. The situation was more complicated in 
the rest of Yugoslavia. 
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The republics leading the drive for democratic reforms to save Yugoslavia were 
Slovenia and Croatia, both of which at the time enjoyed higher standards of living. They 
began by demanding a looser confederation and political reforms on the federal level. In 
their own republics, they approved multi party systems and made amendments to their 
constitutions. An important amendment of the Slovenian constitution stated the right of 
Slovenia to secede from the federation without the mutual consent of the other republics95.
The other republics soon followed, allowing multi party systems and organized elections. 
On the federal level, the late Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic attempted economic 
reforms in the belief that better economic welfare would keep the country together. But 
these were not followed by political reforms. It soon became apparent that holding the 
country together required more than merely economic remedies96.
The much-analyzed elections of the individual republics, made a significant 
contribution to disintegration and the bloody business that began in 1991. Of the six 
republic elections, the anti Communists won four, and a former Communist won the 
presidency in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Milosevic still had the support of Montenegro, 
these election results made it difficult for him to impose his policy of a more unified 
Yugoslavia. Milosevic continued to reject all calls for a looser union in an attempt to 
implement his ideas of a more centralized state97. This came to a head when Milosevic 
called an extraordinary 14th Congress of the LCY for January 1990.  In this Congress, 
President Milan Kucan of Slovenia was shouted down by Milosevic’s supporters when he 
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attempted to present his proposals for a looser union. As it became clear there could be no 
negotiation, the Slovene delegation walked out of the Congress on January 20, never to 
return. This move was followed by Croatian, Bosnian and Macedonian delegations and the 
meeting was canceled98.
Another barrier to Milosevic’s desire for Serb dominance was the break up of the 
Soviet Union and the institution of democracy in Eastern Europe. This made it impossible 
for Milosevic to recentralize Yugoslavia. It also caused the NATO countries to lose interest 
in keeping Yugoslavia united at any cost. Without the bogey of communism, Yugoslavia 
lost its claim to international importance and Yugoslavs could no longer rely on Western 
support to bail them out99. This encouraged the two northern republics to declare 
independence --Slovenia in December 1990, Croatia in May 1991. At first, the secession of 
the two republics was not supported. US Secretary of State James Baker stated in an 
unofficial visit to Belgrade, that the US would not recognize Slovenia and Croatia “under 
any circumstances”. Unfortunately, this statement would be interpreted as permission to 
use limited military power to hold Yugoslavia together. At first, the Western view of 
sovereignty paralleled the Serb view. The European Council believed that the JNA 
(Yugoslav Peoples Army) would be capable of taking measures and suppressing what they 
regarded as a domestic problem100.
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The role of International Community and Self-determination in Regard to Break 
Apart Republics 
The declarations of independence, and especially the use of force by the JNA 
against Slovenia and later support of Croatian Serbs, created a number of dilemmas for the 
leaders of the European Community (EC), in their efforts to manage the crisis. In the early 
1990’s, the EC, later to become European Union (EU) sponsored a peace conference on 
Yugoslavia in The Hague. The conference declared that there should be no unilateral 
change of borders by force, protection for the rights of all Yugoslav peoples, and full 
account of their legitimate concerns and aspirations101. In late 1992, the Maastricht Treaty 
was signed. One of the main points of the meeting was the issue of the recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia. Under pressure from the German delegation, the EC voted to 
recognize the two northern republics. The move was opposed by the US because the other 
republics were not offered a chance of independence102.
Guided by US objections, European countries started to work on the set of rules, 
which would set standards for the recognition of new states resulting from the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Using these rules, the EC adopted a common position 
with regard to the recognition of Yugoslavia103. An arbitration commission was established 
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under the Carrington Conference in The Hague and was headed by the French 
constitutional lawyer Robert Badinter, to judge the case for recognition of any Republic. 
As requested by the Guidelines, the Badinter Commission received applications for 
recognition by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Macedonia. After receiving 
these applications, the Arbitration Commission in its first opinion on the former 
Yugoslavia (following the letter from Lord Carrington, President of the Conference of 
 
- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments 
subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard 
to the rule of law, democracy and human rights 
- guarantee the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the 
commitments subscribed to in the framework of CSCE 
- respect the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and 
by common agreement 
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation as well as to security and regional stability 
- commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, 
all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes 
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Yugoslavia on November 20, 1991) stated that Yugoslavia was in the process of 
dissolution104.
As the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was recognized, Serbia attempted to 
manipulate the Serbian population living in Croatia and Bosnia to demand self-
determination. At the Arbitration Commission, Serbia asked if the Serbian population in 
Croatia and Bosnia had the right to self-determination, and whether the international 
boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia could 
be regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law. With respect to the first 
question, the Arbitration Commission concluded that, the right to self-determination must 
not involve changes of existing frontiers at the time of independence, therefore the 
principle of uti possidetis juris should be utilized, except where states concerned agreed 
otherwise. It added that ethnic, religious or language communities should enjoy 
recognition of their identity under international law. With respect to the second question, 
the Arbitration Commission stated that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution. It 
recognized former republic frontiers as international frontiers and therefore non violable 
under international law and the former Yugoslavian constitution105.
As requested by the commission, the four republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia) submitted their applications for independence. With regards 
to Slovenia, the situation was clear. The population was homogenous, and a referendum 
held by Slovenia showed massive support for an independent state. Croatia was found to 
 
104 Supra note 98 at 82 
105 See Opinion No. 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Commission on the former Yugoslavia, 11 January 1992, 
available supra note 98 at 82 – 83  
37
qualify except for the fact that its Constitution of December 4, 1991 did not offer any 
guarantees to protect minorities. The Commission urged Croatia to amend its constitution 
with regard to this. The EC recognized both Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992, 
although Croatia did not make constitutional amendments as required.  
With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission found that the local Serb 
population had not associated itself with the declaration of independence made by the 
Legislature, nor with constitutional changes subsequently put forward. The Commission 
also took note of a declaration made on November 10, 1991 by the Serbian people of 
Bosnia–Herzegovina, stating that they wished to remain within Yugoslavia or, should 
Bosnia–Herzegovina separate itself from Yugoslavia, to establish a separate Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia–Herzegovina. Therefore the commission concluded that the will of the 
people of Bosnia–Herzegovina for an independent state had not been fully established. It 
urged that an international monitored referendum be held in the future106. The Bosnian 
government immediately promised to hold such a vote, setting it for February 29 and 
March 1, 1992107. Bosnia’s referendum duly took place, and was boycotted by the Serbs. 
The Muslims and Croats provided the majority in favor of independence. In response, the 
Serbs declared independence from Bosnia and fighting occurred. To cease the fighting, the 
EC recognized independence on April 6, 1992, and the US recognized Slovenia, Croatia 
 
106 Thomas Musgrave, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997) at 118 – 119  
107 During this period the Serbs did everything to ensure the vote could be discredited by a boycott, if not 
stopped altogether. It also gave them time to prepare their forces to announce their own secession in order to 
remain within Yugoslavia when the Croat and Muslim populations inevitably voted for independence. In that 
case war was guaranteed, see supra note 99 at 128 - 129 
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and Bosnia the following day108. As for Macedonia (even though the European Community 
qualified Macedonia for independence), a dispute arose over the name. Greece opposed the 
favorable action because there is a Greek province known as “Macedonia”. Greece feared 
that the state of Macedonia would make territorial claims on its province, even though the 
Arbitration Commission had found that “use of the name” Macedonia could not be taken to 
imply any territorial claim with respect to another state. Macedonia was subsequently 
recognized on April 8, 1993, when a compromise solution was found whereby it was 
admitted to the United Nations under the name of “the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia” pending settlement of its name109.
Kosova and its Peaceful Manner to Self-Determination 
In Kosova, the Serbian apparatus of repression allowed the mask to fall. Heavily 
armed police brutally beat and killed many Albanians. As Serbia could not now obtain 
consent from Kosova institutions, Albanians who wanted to remain in their jobs were 
asked to sign a document that would legitimate Serbian authority in Kosova110. While 
Kosovar Albanians were prepared to fight to hang on to a minimum of human rights, their 
prospect of successful defense in a full-scale war was remote. They did not have the 
weapons to defend themselves, nor control over the territory or their people. The so-called 
 
108 Id at 129, Bosnia – Herzegovina was a mixture of Serbs, Croats and Muslims where Muslims comprised 
40 percent of the population, Serbs 32 percent and Croats 18 percent See also supra note 103 at 119 
109 Supra note 103 at 118 –19, see also, Viktor Meier, YUGOSLAVIA, A HISTORY OF ITS DEMISE 
(1999) at 181 - 182 
110 Viktor Meier, YUGOSLAVIA, A HISTORY OF ITS DEMISE at 94 – 96  
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territorial defense of Kosova and its police forces had been disarmed and put under 
Belgrade’s tight control in the mid 1980’s.  
As in a system of apartheid, the Albanians built up parallel institutions, beginning 
in 1989 when Kosovar autonomy was abolished by Serbia111. The Legitimate Assembly of 
Kosova, a lawful organ according to the constitution of 1974, moved on July 2, 1990 to 
declare Kosova an equal and independent unit within the still existing Yugoslav federation. 
Belgrade’s regime reacted brutally to this act, closing down the Kosova Assembly which 
went into hiding and continued to work without Serb and Montenegrin deputies. In the 
referendum held from September 26-30, 1990 organized by the same Assembly, 87% of 
the population of Kosova participated.  99.8% voted for Kosova’s independence112.
These moves were very important to keep pace with the new and rapidly changing 
circumstances. On December 22, 1991, the self-styled Government of Kosova, in exile, 
handed over its application for international recognition of Kosova’s independent 
statehood, to the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia113. Despite the fact that 
Kosova had its own territorial base and population, the application for international 
recognition of Kosova’s full independence did not get a positive response from the 
international community. This was because parallel institutions and organs (the self-styled 
government of Kosova and the equally self-styled President of Kosova) did not have 
coercive powers and authority to effectively control their own territory and population. The 
 
111 Supra note 15 at 236, see also supra note 41 at 100 - 101 
112 Id at 237, see also supra note 33 at 409 – 410  
113 Supra note 99 at 81 
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Kosovar government living in exile had neither army nor police to assert itself 
domestically or internationally. 114 
The years of peaceful opposition saw Albanians lives worsen every day. Serbia 
removed Albanians from their jobs and filled them with Serbs who were encouraged to 
resettle from Bosnia and Croatia. An organization established in Prishtina, called “the 
Serbian Block for colonization”, put high level pressure on the administration to accelerate 
the Serbian re-colonization of the province. Belgrade offered credits, housing and jobs to 
those Serbs and Montenegrins willing to settle in Kosova115.
In response, Kosova Albanians organized military units to defend their rights by 
resorting to force. The first was the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) – Ushtria Clirimtare e 
Kosoves (UCK) which I will discuss in the next chapter. It was formed because of the 
repressive policies of the Belgrade regime and the reluctance of the international 
community to respond to the Kosovar Albanian leadership116.
114 Id at 237 
115 Miranda Vickers, BETWEEN SERBS AND ALBANIANS, A HISTORY OF KOSOVA (1998), at 262 – 
263, see also supra note 33 at 410 - 411 
116 Id at 238 
41
Chapter Six 
Fighting for Self Determination 
Reluctant Resort to War 
Failed attempts of Kosovar Albanians to gain international support in their quest 
for final independence, led to growing disappointment. The Dayton Accord was signed in 
December 1995. Richard Holbrook, who led the US delegation and who was the prime 
mover in the talks, insisted that the only issue on the agenda was a peaceful resolution to 
the war in Bosnia. Kosova would have to wait117. Therefore some Albanians concluded 
that a commitment to a peaceful resolution of the problem was not the best way to pursue 
independence of Kosova. Moreover, Albanians perceived the creation of the Republika 
Srpska alongside the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation that came out of the accords, as 
international support of violence to achieve goals. This is because this entity did not exist 
as a matter of law before Dayton, but rather as a de facto entity due to war118. The 
international community was ready to negotiate the situation of the remaining Serb 
population in Croatia and Bosnia but failed to address the issue of the position of 
Albanians. 
By ignoring the situation in Kosova, the Dayton Accord strengthened the position 
of Milosevic at the international and domestic levels. He would be seen as a man of peace 
because he signed the Dayton Accords and Serbia could now claim legitimate sovereignty 
 
117 William G. O’Neill, KOSOVO, AN UNFINISHED PEACE (2002) at 22 
118 Id, see also: General Framework on Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonframework.html 
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over Kosova119. In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, Dragoljub Micunovic, one of the 
most influential Serbian opposition leaders, told the media that Serbia felt validated 
because the international community recognized its frontiers as international borders, the 
territory of Kosova included within them120. The international community would start 
removing economic sanctions imposed previously on the former Yugoslavia as a result of 
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. To do so, in December 1996, the European Union released 
a Common Position on Terminating Restrictions of Economic and Financial Relations, but 
neglected the situation and continuous atrocities in Kosova121.
The pacifist movement in Kosova never received any serious commitment from the 
international community toward resolution of the problem. It was only given verbal 
support despite some international human rights activists monitoring the situation122. The 
Serbian position, after the Dayton Accord, coincided with the international stance towards 
non-violability of borders in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter on integral sovereignty. The 
international community encouraged political dialogue between Kosovan Albanians and 
Belgrade, which Milosevic used to improve his international position123.
119 Miron Rezun, EUROPE’S NIGHTMARE, THE STRUGGLE FOR KOSOVO (2001) at 42 – 43 
120 This would be reiterated later by the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Nebojsa Pavkovic, 
upon signing the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999 which made possible for NATO troops to enter 
Kosova, see supra note 15 at  239 
121 See: Official Journal NO. L 095, 27/03/1998 P. 0001 – 0003, 498X0240 
122 Report by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, THE KOSOVO RERPORT: 
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSON LEARNED, (2000) at 60 
123 Milosevic played international politics by signing the agreement on the normalization of the educational 
system for Kosovan Albanians. The agreement was mediated by the community of Saint Eggidio but was 
never implemented. Kosovan Albanians held talks with the opposition leaders of Serbia in New York (USA) 
and Ulcin (Montenegro) during March and June 1996. These means proved ineffective in improving any 
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It would take another war followed by many massacres and expulsion of Albanians, 
to get the international community to halt the atrocities. However as we shall see, the 
international intervention in Kosova that took place in 1999 to halt state atrocities also 
would preserve the integral sovereignty of the former Yugoslavia. The refusal of the Serbs 
to engage in dialogue, and the reluctance of the international community to properly 
address the situation in Kosova, led to the creation of the military unit, Ushtria Clirimtare e 
Kosoves (UCK) – Kosova Liberation Army124. It subsequently gained support of the 
Albanian population, which began to feel that the only way to achieve rights was a resort 
to violence. The UCK would gradually become an important military and political factor in 
Kosova.  
The emergence of the UCK was used by the Serbian regime to mount attacks 
against civilians under the pretense of hunting for UCK members. Serb counter attacks 
resulted in destruction of entire villages and produced large numbers of civilian 
casualties125. The presence of the UCK enabled Milosevic to justify his regime’s ethnic 
cleansing of Kosova, including the displacement and murder of many others126. According 
 
sustainable form of self-determination over Kosova and its majority population. However, it gained Belgrade 
some points in the international community as a good effort to ease the tensions in Kosova, see supra note 42 
at 87. 
124 The Kosova Liberation Army was founded in 1993 and subsequently gradually gained vast support of the 
Albanians, see supra note 4 at 117 
125 Richard Caplan, International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Oct. 1998, Vol. 74, No. 4, at 745 – 761 
126 Supra note 51 at 58. Massive killings of the Kosovan Albanians started by the end of February when 26 
civilian Albanians were killed in the villages of Qirez and Likoshan, which was followed with the death of 58 
Albanians, in attempt to kill the founder and Commander of the UCK. Among them there were eighteen 
women and ten children under the age of 16. See also supra note 4 at 139 – 140  
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to the Belgrade newspaper, Nedeljni Telegraf of March 11, 1998, after the massacre in the 
Drenica region, a Serbian military analyst from Prishtina noted that “we are far from 
killing all the terrorists…. during the last two weeks at least 50 of them were killed, that 
number could be supplied by each individual village alone”127.
The murderous acts of the Yugoslav and Serbian state were supported, not only by 
the governing parties in Serbia, but also by the opposition. The Yugoslav army recruited 
and engaged paramilitary-mafia type groups. Their aim was to commit horrific atrocities 
that would make the whole people leave their homeland. Their goal was to replace them by 
Serbian settlers.  They chose their Albanian victims from areas that Serbs were interested 
in controlling and drew up maps to guide their actions. These were always areas that 
included the larger towns, the more important mines and strips of territory along main 
roads connecting them. In spite of their public comments claiming they wanted to keep 
control of Kosova because of their historical heritage, they were not, in fact, interested in 
the so-called Serbian cultural monuments.128. Areas outside their interest were to be given 
some kind of autonomy to Albanians in Kosova, but still remaining in Serbia. 
 
127 Cited by Frank Muenzel, What does Public International Law have to say About Kosovar Independence 
(1998), JURIST, the Law Professors’ Network, available, at http://jurist.law.edu/simop.htm 
128 There was an insignificant group of people gathered around the Citizen’s Union of Vesan Pesic and 
Montenegro, which condemned the Serbian and Yugoslav actions, see Frank Maunzel, What does 
International Law have to say About Kosovar Independence? (1998), Jurist: The Law Professros’s Network, 
pp. 9 – 10  
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NATO Reaction to the Milosevic Policies and the Rambouillet Peace Process 
The new situation on the ground triggered UN actions. On March 31, 1998, the UN 
Security Council issued Resolution 1160 that called for a cease fire and urged parties to 
begin talks for a substantial autonomy of Kosova. It was followed by UNSC Resolution 
1199 which called for halting the violence and allowing international monitors to observe 
the situation. The resolutions did not have any binding obligation, and the Serbian regime 
ignored them129. The threat and possible use of force by NATO caused tensions with 
permanent Security Council members Russia and China.130. But now, clearly, the problem 
of Kosova was not an internal affair. Rather the problem was the failure of Serbia to 
commit to human rights which could only lead to international tension and a breach in 
regional security131 
The international community began a “carrot and stick” policy. Richard Holbrook, 
assigned by President Bill Clinton and the architect of the Dayton Accord, reappeared 
again to deal with the situation. At the same time, NATO threatened Milosevic with air 
strikes if he did not halt his attacks on civilians. Using this threat as his main bargaining 
chip, Holbrook secured Milosevic’s agreement in October 1998 to withdraw most of his 
forces and allow deployment of 2000 unarmed international inspectors to verify 
compliance with the agreement as a “confidence–building measure” for the civilian 
population. The mission established was called the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). 
 
129 See: UNSC Resolution 1160, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm, UNSC Resolution 1199, 
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm 
130 Marc Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, International Affairs, April 99, vol75 issue 2, p211, 
51p 
131 See OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 218, March 11, 1998 
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Ambassador William Walker was appointed to head the KVM October 17, 1998. The UCK 
declared a unilateral truce on October 16, 1998132. The UNSC acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, issued resolution 1203 which appraised the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement 
and establishment of the KVM, and called parties to respect resolution 1160 and 1199. It 
also warned of an escalation of a situation that could pose a threat to international 
security133.
The KVM initially was successful and its presence led to a cease fire from both 
parties. Soon afterwards, though, the Serbian regime broke the agreement and unleashed an 
offensive against Kosova villages. As in the past, the reason given was the need to fight 
Kosova “terrorists” and as before, the attacks were directed against civilians as a whole 
rather than against the UCK134. The KVM established a Human Rights Division to monitor 
and investigate reports on allegations of human rights abuses by all parties in the conflict 
in Kosova. The KVM analysis of the situation came to the conclusion that: 1) the violence 
perpetrated against Albanians was planned and organized at the highest levels of Serbian 
authority, 2) the Serb Army, police and various paramilitary forces specifically targeted 
various segments of Kosovo Albanian Society, 3) sexual crimes against woman and young 
girls were widespread135.
132 Supra note 114 at 24, see also supra note 42 at 105,  supra note 98 at 294, OSCE appoints Head of Kosovo 
Verification Mission, October 17 1998, Kosovo Monitor Mission Gear Up, BBC, November 24, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/221151.stm 
133 See, UNSC Resolution 1203, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1203.htm 
134 Supra note 127 
135 The Analysis also reported atrocities committed which were mainly concentrated on Albanian 
collaborationists with Serbian regime and forces, see. Kosovo/a: As Seen, As Told, An Analysis of the 
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In January 1999, Serbian forces committed another attack at the village of Recak. 
The aftermath was witnessed by KVM ambassador William Walker who concluded that 
there “is no doubt” that this was an act of massacre. After this, the Serbian regime 
attempted to declare the head of the KVM persona non grata and remove him from its 
territory. As armed incidents proliferated, the KVM appeared an increasingly helpless 
observer to the unraveling of the October Holbrook agreement136.
The international community became aware that the situation demanded a more 
coercive approach. To achieve this, they needed to have Russia on board as relations 
between NATO and its allies worsened during the crisis in Kosova137. In an effort to find a 
peaceful solution, the US foreign Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. They called upon the Serbian authorities to carry out the 
commitments in their 11 point Statement of Principles of a Political Settlement of October 
13, 1998. They also agreed to maintain close contact in order to coordinate US and Russian 
support for a resolution of the crisis. The next day, the US announced that a strategy 
agreed upon by its allies, would resolve the crisis in Kosovo by “combining diplomacy 
 
Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission in October 1998 to June 1999, available 
at  http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/1999/11/17755_506_en.pdf 
136 Serbian authorities tried to abuse with the victims by using Serb pathologists who showed how much 
politics can be involved even in the professional work of the doctors. Serb pathologist tried to claim that 
there was no massacre. On the other hand investigators from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia were barred from Serb authorities from entering Kosova, see, Marck Weller, The 
Rambouillet, ….. see also, Pathologists, No Kosovo massacre, BBC, January 19, 1999, 
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with a credible threat of force.” It would be implemented through a decision of the Contact 
Group. The threats for military action were repeated by NATO Secretary General Havier 
Solana and urged both parties to cease fire138.
On January 19, 1999, the Contact Group (composed of US, England, Italy, France, 
Germany and Russia) on the former Yugoslavia agreed to summon representatives from 
FRY, the Serbian government, and representatives of the Kosova Albanians to Rambouillet 
on February 06, 1999. The Contact Group set a timetable for negotiations. The timetable 
referred to pervious resolutions, 1160, 1199, 1203, confirmed the international position of 
non-violability of the borders, and urged the parties to find a common solution for the 
crisis. The goal of the international community was to work toward achieving a substantial 
autonomy for Kosova. They warned that both parties would be held accountable if they 
failed to take the opportunity, but assured them that the Group would be ready to work 
with both sides. The talks were set to start on February 6, 1999 in Rambouillet (Southwest 
of Paris, France)139.
The stance of the international community preempted the whole negotiating 
process. Before any discussion could begin, they put foreword for signature certain so-
 
138 Supra note 127 at  
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called non-negotiable principles140. These principles stressed the inviolability of the FRY’s 
borders, which implied that any solution had to be found within FRY’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. In practical terms, this meant that Kosova and its majority population 
would have to remain satisfied with the internal right to self-determination. This was in 
accord with previous resolutions and declarations of the international community on the 
substantial autonomy for Kosova141. The draft presented to the parties at the outset of the 
conference was for an interim period. It stated that after three years, there would be a 
comprehensive assessment of the agreement under international auspices with the aim of 
improving its implementation and determining the need for proposals by either side for 
additional steps. On the Kosovar Albanian request that the conference be based on the will 
 
140 The Rambouillet Accords setr a kind of self-governance in Kosova realized through legislative, executive 
and judiciary bodies. All the national communities would be represented at all levels, decentralization, and 
mixed police. It required harmonized Serbian and federal legal frameworks with the Kosova interim 
agreement. For any changes of borders it required Kosova consent. Other points included issues on Human 
Rights, which required commitment to an international human rights framework and establishment of an 
ombudsperson. Also it included an implementation process to be composed of a dispute resolution 
mechanism, establishment of a joint commission to supervise implementation and participation of OSCE and 
other international bodies as necessary. Based on this framework of Rambouillet Accords, the international 
community wanted to re-establish autonomy for Kosova that it enjoyed with the Yugoslav Constitution of 
1974. After so many killings and massacres this needed a huge commitment from Kosova Albanians to agree 
to talk. They did agree to participate on the condition that the territorial integrity of FRY would be limited to 
the interim period after which the people of Kosova would determine their fate. The Albanian side was now 
represented by the political wing of the UCK and other pacific political forces. They took the lead of the 
negotiating team of Kosova.  
141 Supra note 15 at 244 – 245, see also opening speech of the President of France, Jacques Chirac, of the 
Rambouillet Conference, available at Chirac: The World is Watching, BBC, February 06, 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/274027.stm, again it stated that the international community will 
not tolerate proliferation of conflict.  
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of the people of Kosova through a referendum, the negotiators pointed out that they were 
not authorized by the Contact Group to adopt language on a referendum142.
Despite guarantees given to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY, the 
Serbian delegation refused to sign the agreement. Instead, the regime continued its war 
campaign throughout Kosova expelling hundreds of thousands of Albanians out of their 
homes. The humanitarian situation became a real threat to the peace and security of the 
region as hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed the border into neighboring states. 
NATO was forced to act under its declaration of January 30, 1999 and previous resolutions 
of the UNSC. NATO air strikes started on March 24 and lasted until the agreement on June 
20, 1999 between NATO and the Serbians. The strikes aimed to end the humanitarian 
crisis and return the refugees, but also preserve the regional peace and security. These air 
strikes brought about the territorial integrity and sovereignty of FRY and the protection of 
the Kosovar Albanian population.  Finally, they set the stage for a political solution of the 
Kosova issue to grant a “substantial autonomy” for the region143.
Withdrawal of Serbian troops paved the way for the return of refugees and 
installation of the UN administration, which is discussed in the next chapter. The 
establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosova (UNMIK) would help Kosova with 
rebuilding institutions and prepare for the negotiation of the final status. 
 
142 Supra note 127 at 22 – 23 
143 Supra note 15 at 247 
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Chapter Seven 
A State in Embryo 
Installation of International Administration and Resolution 1244: Denial of the Right 
to Self-Determination 
After 78 days of NATO air strikes, the Serbian regime finally conceded defeat. The 
Technical Military agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia, between NATO and Serbian 
Army representatives allowed for a smooth NATO entrance while Serb forces withdrew 
from Kosova. This created conditions for installing the UN administration in Kosova 
(UNMIK) enacted by the UN Security Council resolution 1244144. The resolution was 
based on the general principles adopted by the G-8 Foreign Ministers on the political 
solution to the crisis in Kosova145. Resolution 1244 embraced these principles and all prior 
resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 of the Security Council. The Resolution created a unique 
political and institutional hybrid: a UN protectorate with unlimited powers whose purpose 
was to prepare the province for substantial autonomy and self-government. It reaffirmed 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while 
promising substantial autonomy and self-government for Kosova. Thus Yugoslav 
 
144 See UNSC Resolution 1244 adopted on 12 June 1999, available at 
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145 The General Principles called for the end of violence, withdrawal of Serb military and police from 
Kosova, deployment of international civil and security presences, establishment of an interim administration 
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sovereignty would be temporarily suspended while the UN prepared Kosova for substantial 
autonomy and negotiated the final political status of Kosova146.
The resolution called for a demilitarized zone with NATO only forces, under the 
name of Kosova Forces (KFOR). Annex 2/6 of the resolution allowed Yugoslav troop to 
assist KFOR on mine clearance, maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites and 
maintaining a presence and key border crossing points. It called for the dissolution of the 
recognized KLA forces. With the agreement of June 21, 1999 between the KLA and 
NATO, the KLA was transformed into a civil body called the Kosova Protection Corps 
(KPC) under the supervision of the KFOR147.
In a formal sense, the policy of Greater Serbia was not defeated in Kosova because 
the international community treated Kosova as an integral part of the FRY148. This helped 
the Serb positions in negotiations that began in 2005, following six years of an 
international presence in Kosova. Despite all the success achieved in Kosova, the UNSC 
Resolution 1244 would be the main weapon of the Serbian representatives. They would 
use it to calm Serbian nationalism by claiming that Kosova was still formally part of 
Serbia.  At the same time, they would use the Resolution to control the future of Kosova in 
spite of growing international sympathy toward Kosova independence. In creating the 
UNMIK, the international community strove to avoid the confusion of power sharing that 
led to failure in Bosnia. Rather, they created a more streamlined structure. The head of 
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international administration is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) 
who reports directly to the UN Secretary General. Right under the SRSG, is a Principal 
Deputy Special Representative. The UNMIK is in charge of civil matters while the security 
belongs to KFOR, which reports outside the UNMIK structure to NATO headquarters in 
Belgium149.
To perform its mandate under Resolution 1244, the UNMIK established four basic 
pillars that are to be supervised by the SRSG. The four pillars are: police and justice under 
the direct leadership of the UN, civil administration under the direct leadership of the UN, 
democratization and institution building led by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation of Europe (OSCE), and reconstruction and economic development led by the 
European Union (EU). The Principal Deputy together with the four heads of the pillars 
forme the SRSG’s executive committee150. The SRSG established the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure (JIAS) as the only political authority in Kosova. The JIAS 
officially replaced all previous parallel institutions. It was to be a provisional decision until 
democratic elections enabled the establishment of a more permanent structure. In an effort 
to bring local representatives into the political process, the SRSG established the Kosovo 
Transitional Council (KTC) as the highest consultative body of the Joint Interim 
Administrative Structure (JIAS). The body was composed of the main political parties, 
members of the Interim Administrative Council (IAC)151, religious community leaders, 
 
149 Supra note 114 at 37 
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151 The Interim Administrative Council was established as part of JIAS which is composed of the members of 
the Albanian political parties, participants at the Ramouillet Peace Accords, an observer, a representative of 
the Serb community and UNMIK senior officials. 
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representatives of the national communities and independents together with representatives 
of civil society152. The basic legal structure was developed by the so called UNMIK 
regulations, which were to be passed under the authority of the SRSG.  
 To open the way for democratic elections, the first step was to prepare the legal 
structure. The SRSG with the UNMIK Regulation of May 15, 2001 declared the 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self–Government. The Constitutional 
Framework set up the responsibilities of the provisional institutions of self-government. 
The most important provisions are the so called powers and responsibilities reserved for 
the SRSG153. At times they undermine Kosovar institutions because many of their actions 
are to be approved by the SRSG.154.
The Constitutional Framework recalls the UNSC Resolution 1244 and takes into 
account the most important international documents, the UN Charter, and the most 
important UN and EU Human rights documents. In an effort to guarantee minority rights, 
the Constitutional Framework established a 120 seat parliament out of which 20 seats were 
reserved for minority groups (10 seats to the Serbs and 10 to the other minorities). The 
Constitutional Framework paved the way for the first central elections that established the 
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first democratically elected institutions in Kosova. The first central elections were held in 
2001 and the second was organized in 2004 by the OSCE. Both elections were 
characterized as free and fair both by local and international representatives155. Despite 
this, the Constitutional Framework did not set up a mechanism for the solution of the final 
status of Kosova156.
From the beginning, the installation of the international administration was meant 
to be of a provisional nature. Afterwards, different options were proposed for the final 
status of Kosova. The Independent International Commission on Kosova in its 2000 year 
report, proposed five possible solutions, one of them being conditional independence. In 
time, this solution would receive broader support on the international level157. The options 
suggested by the Commission go beyond Resolution 1244, which has become no longer 
useful as a framework for managing the future of Kosova. Its essential commitments to 
 
155 In 2005 the activities of organizing elections were transferred to the Kosovo’s Central Election 
Commission Secretariat which will continue to be headed by the Head of OSCE Mission in Kosova See 
OSCE 
156 See, QIK, Informatori Ditor, 15 Maj 2001, (Center for Information of Kosova, Daily Report, May 15, 
2001) 
157 Other possible solutions presented by IIC were: 1) Protectorate that takes the current status of Kosova and 
extends it indefinitely into the future. This solution is not supported by the Kosovar Albanians, 2) Partition of 
Kosova part dominated by Serbs especially the northern part of Kosova. This option at some point was raised 
by some Serbs as the solution if Kosova would be granted independence. This option was recently objected 
to by the Special Representative of the UN for negotiations, Marti Ahtisari in his visit to Prishtina on 
November, 2005, 3) Autonomy within a democratic Yugoslavia. That is a solution offered lately by the 
Serbian officials but opposed totally on the Albanian side, 4) Full independence which is the solution 
supported by Kosovar Albanians but opposed  by the Serbs. The international community in this case is 
mainly concerned with the situation of the minorities, see supra note 120 at 263 – 279, see also Ahtisari 
protiv podele Kosova, B92, November 23, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=11&dd=23&nav_id=180999 
56
FRY sovereignty and Kosova autonomy may not be incompatible in theory but they have 
become incompatible in practice. This is because the Kosovar Albanians unanimously 
refused to be co-opted into the FRY158.
The Final Status Talks: Their Potential Frame and Limits 
Recognizing the new reality, but concerned with the democratization process, 
especially the situation of the minorities, the international community created standards 
that needed to be met by Kosovar institutions. These standards consisted of eight main 
benchmarks that would be used to test the ability of Kosovar institutions to build a state of 
law and in particular, protect minorities159. A successful evaluation of these standards 
would begin the negotiating process. The green light was given after UN special 
representative Kay Eide, presented a positive report to the SRSG. On October 7, 2005, the 
UN Secretary General informed the Security Council that conditions existed for a dialogue 
to begin, with the international community mediating the negotiations. To facilitate the 
process of negotiation, the UNSC appointed former Finish Prime Minister, Marti Ahtisari, 
to head the international mediators160.
158 Supra note 119 at 262 - 263 
159 The eight standards are: 1) functioning democratic institutions, 2) rule of law, 3) freedom of movement, 4) 
sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members, 5) economy, 6) property rights, 7) 
dialogue, and 8) Kosovo protection corps. 
160 See: Anan preporucio pocetak pregovora, B92, October 07, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=07&nav_id=177995, Eide predavao 
izvestaj Ananu, B92, October 05, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=05&nav_id=177882, The Eide report 
was criticized by the Serbian  side as too weak and not comprehensive, see Eide je trebalo da bude ostriji, 
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Due to conflicting interests between the two parties, the Contact Group constructed 
ten basic principles upon which the future status should be determined161. Some principles 
 
B92, October 09, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=09&nav_id=178120 
161 The Contact Group Guiding Principles for the final status of Kosova are: 1)The settlement of Kosova 
issue should be fully compatible with international standards of human rights, democracy and international 
law and contribute to regional security, 2) the settlement of Kosovo’s Status should conform with democratic 
values and European standards and contribute to realizing the European perspective of Kosovo, in particular, 
Kosovo’s progress in the stabilization and association process, as well as the integration of the entire region 
in Euro-Atlantis institutions, 3) The settlement should ensure multi-ethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It 
should provide effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to ensure the implementation 
of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo and of the right of members of all Kosovo communities, including 
the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 4) The settlement should 
provide mechanisms to ensure the participation of Kosovo communities in government, both on the central 
and on the local level. Effective structures of local self-government established through the decentralization 
process should facilitate the coexistence of different communities and ensure equitable and improved access 
to public services, 5)The settlement of Kosovo’s status should include specific safeguards for the protection 
of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. This should include provisions specifying the status of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s institutions and sites of the patrimony in Kosovo, 6) The settlement of Kosovo’s 
status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the 
pre-March 1999 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be 
unacceptable. There will be no change in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e.  no partition of Kosovo and no 
union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of 
regional neighbors will be fully respected, 7) The Status settlement will ensure Kosovo’s security. It will also 
ensure that Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its neighbors. Specific provisions on the 
security arrangements will be included, 8) The settlement of Kosovo’s status should promote effective 
mechanisms to strengthen Kosovo’s ability to enforce the rule of law, to fight organized crime and terrorism 
and safeguard the multi-ethnic character of the police and the judiciary, 9) The settlement should ensure that 
Kosovo can develop in a sustainable way both economically and politically and that it can cooperate 
effectively with international organizations and international financial institutions, 10) For some time Kosovo 
will continue to need an international civilian and military presence to exercise appropriate supervision of 
compliance of the provisions of the Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for 
minorities as well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued implementation of standards, see: 
Annex of the Letter dated November 10, 2005 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the 
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related to the eight standards already in the process of fulfillment. Perhaps the most 
important principle is principle 6, which states firmly that Kosova would not return to its 
status before March 1999, that there would not be a partition, and that there would not be 
union with another state. But confusion remained. Could some kind of union with Serbia 
possibly meet the criteria of the principles? 
At present (2006), the international community is leaning more towards conditional 
independence, which would mean some international presence within Kosova even after 
independence. The Director of the British Foreign Office, John Souers, stated that 
independence is one option162. Some state leaders recognize the independence of Kosova 
as seen in the statement by President Janez Drnvosec of Slovenia during his visit in 
Kosova. Likewise, the Swiss Chief of Foreign Relations openly stated on January 20, 2006 
in favor of independence163. There also appears to be a shift by the main Serbian ally, 
 
Secretary General, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20709.pdf 
162 When justifying this, Mr. Sojers refers to the situation during the 80’s and 90’s, violence, ethnic cleansing, 
refusal to sign the Rabmouillet Accords and the last war of 1999. He urged Serbian representatives to focus 
their dialogue on decentralization, representation in the government, minority protection, the role of the 
international community, relations of the Kosova Serbs with Serbia etc., see Nezavisnost jeste opcija, B92, 
February 08, 2006, 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/kaziprst.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=08&nav_id=187893, Mr. Souers is a 
British ambassador to UN and a representative in the Contact Group. 
163 See: Drnovsek: Kosovo, realno, nezavisno, B92, November 12, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=11&dd=12&nav_id=180245, see also, Svajcarska 
za nezavisno Kosovo, B92, August, 2005, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=08&dd=01&nav_id=173738, Tim Judah from the 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting stated that in case when parties cannot reach the common solution due 
to their bitter contradicting interests the international community can unilaterally impose conditional 
independence for Kosova, see, IWPR: Uslovna nezavisnost, B92, May 23, 2005, 
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Russia. The head of the Russian office in Prishtina spoke in favor of respecting the will of 
the people of Kosova while respecting the rights of other minorities, in particular the Serb 
minority164.
The Serbian government unveiled their option when Serbian president, Boris Tadic, 
spoke at the Security Council’s meeting on Kosova held on February 14, 2006. He 
suggested that Kosovar Albanians be given a “wide autonomy” that would make them 
independent in most of their day to day life. He also suggested that after a period of time 
(20 years) the issue would be discussed again165. At the same meeting, UNMIK SRSG, 
Soren Jessen Petersen affirmed the stance of the Contact Group that the current status is 
unacceptable. He noted that with the exception of some minor drawbacks of the standards, 
the pace of fulfilling them was going well166. Marti Ahtisary in a recent Contact Group 
meeting reiterated that the will of the people of Kosova had to be considered in 
 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=05&dd=23&nav_id=169017. Director of the 
Project for Democracy and member of the International Commission for the West Balkan, Brus Jackson,  
stated that the Commission should recognize the independence of Kosova, “Priznati Nezavisnots”, B92, June 
01, 2005, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=06&dd=01&nav_id=169647 
164 Bazdikin: Rusia do ta rrepsektoje vullnetin e popullit shumice ne Kosove, RTK, February 13, 2006 
165 This option is not acceptable to the Kosovar Albanians but also it is against the principles set forth by the 
Contact Group. And the interest of the international community is to settle the issue as soon as possible and 
preferably by the end of 2006. 
166 See: Savet Bezbednosti o Kosovo, B92, February 14, 2006. The Serbs also suggest some kind of 
referendum to be held at Serbia’s level (including Kosova) that will decide about the final status, Beograd: 
Iniciativa per referendum mbi statusin e ardhshem te Kosoves, RTK, February 16, 2006, see also: 
Referendum nova mantra?, B92, February 16, 2006 
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determining the final status167. In response, some hard-line Serbian leaders threatened to 
use any means “necessary” to impede the independence of Kosova, if the international 
community decided in favor of any kind of independence for Kosova168.
The international community urged negotiating parties to reach a common solution 
by the end of the year 2006, focusing on protection of the Serb minority in Kosova, and 
Serbian engagement in Kosovar institutions. It is believed that the final status should be 
decided by the will of Kosovar Albanians based on the principle of self-determination. 
Clearly, Albanians have acquired this right both historically and legally.
 
167 He said after the meeting of the Contact Group that in Kosova, 90 % of the population are Albanian and 
that they are to determine the fate of their country, Ahtisari ocekuje nezavisnost Kosova, Blic, February 20, 
2006, http://www.blic.co.yu/ 
168 “Srbiju braniti svim sredstvima”, B92, February 10 2006, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=10&nav_id=188210, Radical Party of 
Serbia is the biggest party in Serbia. 
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Chapter Eight 
CONCLUSIONS: Is Kosova Entitled to Statehood 
Self-determination is one of the most sensitive areas of international law. Its 
meaning and application has been a source of much contradiction and misconception. This 
is due to the fact that self-interest dominates attitudes toward self-determination. States’ 
attitudes toward self-determination shifted and sometimes changed completely depending 
on the impact it would have on a state’s self interest. To would be states, self-
determination is the key that opens the door to that coveted club of statehood. For existing 
states, self-determination is the key for locking the door against the undesirable results 
from within and outside the realm169. The dynamic was simple: self-determination was 
attractive from afar; but unattractive when applied to them. It is however in the post cold 
war period with the break up of the USSR and the former Yugoslavia that new meaning 
was given to the principle of self-determination.    
The origin of the principle of self-determination can be traced back to the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789). However, in 
France this principle was propounded as a standard concerning the transfer of territory and 
it was applied only in cases where it would favor France. It was first put into practice in 
Italy where it was joined with the concept of national unification based on self-
determination. This concept emerged on the international scene during the First World War 
and the Bolshevik Revolution. To Vladimir Ilic Lenin, it was a means to achieve the dream 
 
169 Antonio Cassese, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995) at 1 – 7. However in overall self-
determination has been one of the most important driving forces in the new international community. It has 
set in motion a restructuring and redefinition of the world community’s basic “rules of the game”.  
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of world socialism.  For Woodrow Wilson, it was the key to a lasting peace in Europe170.
Yet Wilson did not apply the concept of self-determination universally. Rather, he saw it 
as applicable only to some subject nationalities as was made evident in his speech to 
Congress on January 8, 1918 outlining his Fourteen Points.  Hence, Poles were able to 
form their own state after the war, but various ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary and the 
Ottoman Empire did not have the same opportunity171. Until the Second World War, the 
principle of self-determination remained essentially a political concept.  
In the post World War II period, the status of self-determination changed 
dramatically. The principle was included in a number of important international 
documents, including the Charter of the UN and the two International Human Rights 
Covenants, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International covenant 
on Economic and Social Rights. These documents focused on self-determination as one of 
the fundamental human rights, thus making it a jus cogens norm.  Their focus was on the 
organization of personal and public life through expression of free will. The documents 
made no reference to external self-determination.  
 
170 France used the principle of self-determination to pave the way for annexation of Belgium in 1793 and the 
Palatinate. Plebiscites were organized and were valid only if the vote was pro-French. Also there was an 
internal limitation of the principle embodied in Title XIII of the 1793 Draft Constitution presented by 
Condorcet to the National Convention on 15 February 1793 where colonial people were not deemed to have a 
right to self-determination, neither were minorities or ethnic, religious or cultural groups, see id at 11 – 13, 
see also supra note 34 at 32. 
171 In his speech to Congress on 11 February 1918, Wilson stated that, “Peoples are not to be handed about 
from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and 
antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed by their 
own consent. Self-determinations is not a mere phrase, it is an imperative principle of action which statesmen 
will henceforth ignore at their peril. See supra note 103 at 22 – 24. 
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The most influential documents on external self-determination were two General 
Assembly Resolutions: the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
peoples and the Declaration on Friendly Relations. 172 
However, the two UNGA resolutions were unclear regarding what people were 
eligible for external self-determination. In the Cold War, these resolutions were used to 
grant external self-determination to people under colonial rule. This became an important 
precedent for international law and was incorporated into Article 38 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. As a result, minorities or peoples living in sovereign 
states were not included in the right to external self-determination.173 This changed only 
when the international community became aware of the persistent suppression of peoples 
and minorities by sovereign states. As a result, support gradually grew for their right to 
external self-determination.  
Based on this history and the evidence developed in the previous chapters, there are 
three reasons why Kosova Albanians should have the right to self-determination: 1) past 
unjust seizure of territory, 2) dissolution of a country and 3) attempted genocide. While the 
 
172 In the UN Charter the principle of self-determination is enshrined in articles 1(2) and 55. At a time of UN 
Charter the principle was not regarded as a rule of international law, see UN Charter Article 1(2) and 55, see 
also supra note 34 at 33.  Both of the major Human Rights Covenants, ICCPR and ICESR contain the 
principle in Art. 1(1) which provides that “All people have right of self-determination. By virtue of that they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue economic, social and cultural development”, see 
ICCPR Art. 1(1) and ICESR Art. 1(1). The most important General Assembly Resolution about self-
determination are, the Declaration on the granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and 
also the Declaration on Friendly Relations. 
173 Supra note 104 at 59 
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first two are not well supported in the international community, the third is supported by 
court decisions and a number of distinguished scholars. 
The first argument in favor of the right to self-determination is based on Alan 
Buchanan’s scholarship.  He argues that secession is a legitimate measure to rectify a past 
seizure, because it is a means for taking back what was unjustly taken.174 This raises two 
questions: how clear must the title be, and how far in the past must one go to determine the 
rightful owners? The recent case of the Baltic Republic’s secession from the former USSR 
in the early 1990’s, suggests that the “past” may be defined as contemporary.175 Therefore 
it is unnecessary to go far back into history. 
 It is clear that despite strong objections by the Albanians, Kosova was unjustly 
ceded to Serbia after World War I. Even though it was done at a time when the principle of 
self-determination was entering the international realm, the unequal application left the 
Albanians marginalized. 
The second argument in favor of the right to self-determination is dissolution of a 
country.  Yugoslavia formally ceased to exist by the decision of the UN. Additionally, the 
UN denied the Serbian request to inherit the status of Yugoslavia and required Serbia and 
Montenegro to apply for UN membership under the new authority176. Therefore we do not 
 
174 Article by Alan Buchanan, Self-determination, secession, and the rule of law in Robert McKim and J. 
McMahan, THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM (1997) at 310 
175 Id 
176 In its opinion No. 3 dated January 11, 1992 the Arbitration Commission on the former Yugoslavia stated 
that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of breaking up”. Following that the 
Security Council with UN Resolution 757 declined the request by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the United Nations. UN Resolution 777 recommends to the General Assembly that it decide 
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have a continuation of the former state, to which Kosova was a constitutive part, but rather 
the creation of several new states. Based on this, Kosova should have been granted the 
right to self-determination. But at the time, Kosova did not control any territory as other 
seceding republics which were at war with Serbia did. Therefore, Kosova Albanians were 
not granted the right to self-determination, in spite of their peaceful efforts to achieve it. 
Additionally, the clear definition of territory as defined in the Constitution of 
Yugoslavia calls into question all the arguments presented by the Serbian government that 
the independence of Kosova would cause ramifications in the region177. Serbs claim that if 
Kosova were granted the right to self-determination, then the Serbian entity of the Srpska 
Krajina within Bosnia and Herzegovina would also make this demand. However, these 
parallels do not stand up under closer scrutiny. The political situation that existed during 
the former Yugoslavia until its dissolution must be taken into account. There was no 
Serbian entity or organization within Bosnia and Herzegovina that could resemble the case 
of Kosova. The Serbian entity came about as the result of the peace settlement of Dayton. 
At the same time, a territorial definition of self-determination would 
understandably ignite a resort to the principle of utti possidetis. It had already been applied 
to secession of the other former Yugoslav republics, which helped them preserve border 
lines as they existed prior to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Regardless, some 
Serb officials would like to partition an independent Kosova, in order to have a part of 
northern Kosova inhabited with Serbs, join Serbia. If this separation did happen, it would 
 
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the UN 
and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly.   
177 See, Tadiq: Pavaresia e Kosoves mund ta destabilizoj rajonin, RTK, March 08, 2006 
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set an unfortunate precedent in international law. It would cause other peoples within 
former republics to demand unity with Serbia.  In contrast, applying the principle of uti 
possideits would help preserve boundaries that Kosova was guaranteed with the 
Constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974, rather than be a cause of destabilization in the region. 
The third argument which is most supported in the international community is the 
right of self-determination to victimized people. Serbs persistently committed atrocities 
against Albanians using programs created by the highest authorities of the Serbian state 
apparatus. This began in 1844 with the notorious “Nacertania Plan” and was updated by 
other programs during the first and second Yugoslavia. The impact was most obvious 
during the war of 1998-99 when more than 13,000 Albanians were killed and almost 1 
million were forced to leave the country. This writer personally experienced the organized 
expulsion on April 1, 1999 in Prishtina, the capital of Kosova. Two uniformed policemen 
ordered his family to depart with 24 hours or face death. 
Serbian atrocities directed exclusively at Albanians showed a clear intention to 
eliminate them from Kosova. All of the elements of the Serbian campaign would satisfy 
the definition of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide. This states that any acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group would constitute genocide. This should be 
read in relation to Article 3(d) of the Convention, which makes attempts to commit 
genocide a punishable crime. Only NATO intervention stopped Serbian troops from totally 
achieving their goal. Serbian actions, though, make it evident that they were on the path to 
complete genocide of the Albanians of Kosova. 
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The importance of human rights has been clearly articulated in the post Cold War 
world. A state’s legitimacy is based on John Locke’s concept of the fiduciary relationship 
between the government and its people.  In The Function of Civil Government, he stated 
that “the government has a fiduciary responsibility to protect citizens against other citizens 
in a state of nature, as well as against the state.”  State legitimacy is derived from the 
people who are the only sovereign element within a state. People give up their sovereignty 
to government to protect and advance their interests. Therefore, any state action against the 
people ultimately means that a state is stripped of its legitimacy. Unfortunately for a 
number of years, this perception was undermined by the statist view of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference that resulted from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) 
and the misuse of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter by despotic governments.  However, in 
the present day, statehood is increasingly defined in terms of state participation in the 
civilized order. The evaluation for entry into the civilized world is based on human rights. 
Locke’s concept has been resurrected as the criterion for sovereignty. Failure to conform, 
results in the forfeiture of statehood.178 
The importance of human rights on the international level is also evident in the 
formation 2006 of the UN Human Rights Council that replaces the Human Rights 
Commission (HRC). It was overwhelmingly supported by 170 states in the General 
Assembly. The HRC will be composed of representatives from states with the best human 
rights records. The Council will give the General Assembly the right to eliminate any state 
 
178 David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 299, at 11 
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with gross violations of human rights.179. This suggests that in the future, states with 
human rights atrocities might be banned from the UN General Assembly and other related 
UN bodies and mechanisms. 
In modern times, persistent atrocities towards a people are seen as a reason for 
external self-determination of the victimized people. There is no basis for a negotiated 
solution granting some kind of internal self-determination if central authorities are 
consistently oppressive and persistent violators of basic human rights. Furthermore when 
one or more groups are engaged in an armed conflict for secession in a multinational state, 
it may be too late to plead for a peaceful solution based on internal self-determination180.
Human rights issues as a means for self-determination of groups living in the 
sovereign state were considered in two important cases: Aaland Islands in Finland and 
Quebec in Canada. In the former, the report of the Commission of Rapporteurs appointed 
by the League of Nations in 1919 concluded that international law did not legally support 
the right of self-determination for the people of the Aaland Islands. The report did suggest 
that the separation of a minority from the state of which it forms a part (and in this case 
incorporation to another state) could only be considered as a last resort when the state lacks 
 
179 See: UN Creates New Human Rights Body, BBC, March 15, 2006 
180 Frederic Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-determination in the United Nations Era, 88 Am. J. Int. L. 304 
(1994), at 306, There is a balance of self-determination against the degree of representative government in 
the state. If the government is at the high end of democracy, the only self-determination claims that will be 
given international credence are those with minimal destabilizing effect. If a government is extremely 
unrepresentative, much more destabilizing self-determination claims may well be recognized. See also supra 
note 121 at 359 
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either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees181. Similarly in 
1998, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to issue an opinion about the Quebecs right 
to secession. The Supreme Court concluded that under the Constitution of Canada, Quebec 
did not have the right to secession unilaterally. Rather, all of Canada would have to vote 
for the secession. The Court noted that international law did not support the right in cases 
where minorities freely choose their representatives and are given political, language and 
cultural protection. The Supreme Court did conclude, though, that when a people are 
blocked from the meaningful exercise of their right to self-determination internally, they 
are entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession182.
In conclusion, it is clear that the government of Kosova is already passing one of 
the main tests given by the international community in their eight standard policies. The 
government of Kosova has shown that it is capable of protecting human rights, especially 
minority rights. In this way, Kosova demonstrates its maturity to enter the family of 
civilized nations. Just as importantly, when it becomes a state, it will contribute to the 
region by setting an example for the protection of human rights for all people, regardless of 
ethnicity, religion, language, or cultural background.  
 
181 See: League of Nations Doc. B7 21/68/106 (1921). After the secession of Finland from Russia Swedish 
population of Aaland Island pleaded national self-determination as set forth by Woodrow Wilson, to join 
their mother land, Sweden 
182 See: Reference Re Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, 2 S.C.R 217, 37 Int’l Leg. Mat. 1342 
(1998) 
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